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    Introduction
    This is the final report of a study commissioned by the Belgian 
Secretary of State for Development Co-operation, with the purpose of outlin-
ing possible actions to be adopted by the European Union to ensure a better 
share of total coffee revenues to producers in developing countries. 
  The way to improve the participation of coffee producers in the economic 
gains accrued in the world coffee market translates, ultimately, in their 
receiving a fair price for the commodity they supply. A fair price is not an 
abstract entity in itself, but - in the competitive world economy - is perhaps 
better defined as a market price that results from fair market conditions in 
the whole coffee producing chain. Because of this, as will be seen below, for 
improving the lot of coffee producers, this reports outlines proposals to take 
place in the consuming countries, particularly Europe. 
  At first sight, it might seem a contradiction acting in one region to 
directly impact others, far away. The key to the logic of the argument lies in 
the definition in the previous paragraph. As we try to demonstrate, market 
conditions in the consuming-countries side of the coffee producing chain are 
not fair; the market failures and distortions ingenuously created there are 
responsible for the enormous asymmetry of gains in the two sides. Radical 
positive measures for the coffee farms must begin, ironically, in Brussels.
  The structure of this report is as follows. Section 2  introduces  prelimi-
nary background considerations. A summary of the past and present experi-
ences in the application of supply management schemes is the content of 
Section 3 . Section 4 is an introduction to the main issues in the analysis of 
the coffee market . Finally, section 5 presents the proposals for consumer 
government supporting actions, and suggestions for a series of detailed stud-
ies to support  the actions.6 7
1    Preliminary Considerations
    Coffee is one of the most important agricultural export com-
modities of developing countries, grown and exported by over 70 developing 
countries, with a 1995-2000 value of exports of $ 10.6 billion, employing 
between 20 and 25 million people throughout the world. Most of the coffee 
produced and exported by developing countries is consumed in industrialised 
countries.
  The relation between developing  (producer) and developed (consumer) 
countries has been subject to changes in the last two decades, affecting the 
identity, the market share and the organisation of the actors involved in 
commodity markets. Since coffee has been a vital medium of exchange for 
developing countries, allowing them to earn the necessary foreign exchange 
to import basic capital and consumer goods, these new transformations in the 
global coffee marketing have clear unfavourable redistribution implications 
for developing countries. In many least developed countries (especially in 
Africa and Central America1), coffee plays a key role in rural development 
and incomes earned by the industry have an important impact on the quality 
of living conditions of many small farmers. Hence, central to the develop-
ment challenge is the search for sound policies and their implementation to 
revert the unfavourable redistribution of income, introducing market struc-
tural changes  to directly enhance income-earning capacities of poor groups 
and less developed countries. 
  The institutional framework of the world coffee market has been analysed 
by Ponte (2001) in terms of the distinctive changes that have been taking 
place in the global coffee chain before and after the signature and implemen-
tation of the International Coffee Agreement (ICA) during the period 1962-
1989.
  The combination of large price cycles in the world coffee market, with in-
stability and uncertainty in the coffee export earnings of producing countries, 
was the major incentive for searching an effective stabilisation scheme. After 
a   series of one year agreements  among producing countries to  deal with 
the problem of  instability and oversupply, a long-term agreement , with the 
supporting action of importing countries  was negotiated and signed in 1962.
  The ICA agreement basically set a target price (or a price band) for cof-
fee, together with a system of export quotas as the principal mechanism to 
maintain prices within an agreed range. When the International Coffee Or-
ganisation (ICO) indicator price rose over the set price, quotas were relaxed, 
while a drop bellow this price implied the tightening of the quota. To avoid 
diverted or resold coffee to circumvent the quota with shipments to non-quo-
ta markets, a system of controls, using certificates of origin, was instituted. 
Although not excepted of problems, the agreement achieved its objective 
of raising and stabilising coffee prices (Akiyama and Varangis 1990; Bates 
1997; Daviron 1996; Gilbert 1996; Palm and Vogelvang 1991).
1 In 2000 the value of cofee 
exports as a percentage of total 
commodities exports were the 
highest for four African countries 
(Burundi, 77.3 %, Rwanda, 68.4 
%, Ethiopia 55 % and Uganda 
with 52.8%). Central American 
countries with higher coffee 
dependence ratios were Nicaragua 
with 25.8 %, Guatemala , 24.5 %, 
El Salvador , 21 % and Honduras 
20.5 %. 6 7
  The relative success of the ICA regime has been attributed to different 
factors, among which: the key role of governments in producing countries 
monitoring decision concerning exports, the willingness of Brazil to contract 
market share, the recognition of import substitution strategies which required 
maximisation of export earnings through high commodity prices and  the 
effective participation of importing/consuming countries in monitoring and 
control the quota system.
  During the ICA regime, the global coffee chain was characterised by a 
relatively stable institutional environment, with politically negotiated rules, 
regulated markets in producing countries, with entry barriers in farming and 
regulated trade by local governments, and a balanced distribution of gener-
ated value added between consuming and producing countries. Coffee was 
considered a strict commodity by definition and there where limited pos-
sibilities for product upgrading.  The Global Commodity Chain literature, 
characterises this period as not particularly “driven by any actor” neither 
controlled in producing or consumer countries (Ponte, 2001).
  Fundamental disagreements in the actors perceptions (coffee-consumer 
countries argued for a reduction in the agreed price range due to changes in 
the market situation, while producers wished to restrict supply further on to 
safeguard the minimum price of the range), together with a period of vast 
global surplus, concentrated in countries that had not heretofore been coffee 
powers, and falling prices,  resulted in the collapse of the ICA in 1989.
  With the demise of the ICA, from 1989 onwards, a movement towards 
liberalisation of coffee marketing systems took place in an institutional 
framework where market relations replaced the former system of political 
negotiations over quotas.  The process of market deregulation has fundamen-
tally changed main actor interactions, undermining local producer interests 
and the regulatory position of local governments at the expense of private 
traders, exporters and multinationals.  The main implication of these new 
developments is a world market characterised by buyer-dominated relations 
and a value added shift in the coffee value chain from farmer-producer coun-
tries to consuming country operators (Pelupessy 1999, Talbot 1997).
2    Past and present supply management efforts to 
    stabilise prices
    In a framework characterised by depressed prices and large 
oversupply, the effectiveness of domestic policies can be improved by 
international producers’ co-operative actions in the form of joint supply 
management schemes. In addition, to ensure the effectiveness of the differ-
ent supply management approaches, a well establish programme should take 
the interests of consumer countries fully into account. Thus, the schemes, 
should exceed the limits of a simple cartel , with the only objective to raise 
prices, but rather aim to accomplish  the more realistic objective  of achiev-8 9
ing a level of international prices somewhere in between the actual depressed 
prices and the existing levels during the early 1980s.  Moreover, a higher and 
stable price level, would  constraint the possibility of  a damaging contrac-
tion of productive capacity , protecting  consumers’ interest in case of a 
future expansion of demand for coffee.
  Maizels, Bacon and Mavrotas (1997) have  clearly analysed the alterna-
tive approaches to supply management and the conditions under which their 
implementation  would be most suitable for different beverage markets (cof-
fee , tea and cocoa). The alternative approaches mentioned by these authors,  
which have all been applied in different periods  and in combined forms, are: 
(I) stock reduction schemes, (ii) export quota schemes, (iii) production re-
duction schemes and (iv) the imposition of a uniform ad valorem export tax.  
The actual ICO plan for the establishment of a scheme designed to eliminate 
low-grade coffees from the market can be regarded as a programme combin-
ing elements of the above mentioned supply management schemes.2
  The export quota scheme, and a variation of it, known under the name of 
retention schemes,  are among the most traditional forms of supply manage-
ment applied by producer (consumer) countries. The export quota scheme 
based on a control of export entitlements differs from a traditional export 
quota in the sense that its main objective is to promote confidence that prices 
are likely to improve with the reduction of stocks , influencing prices indi-
rectly by improving market attitude.  Negotiations for the establishment of 
an export quota scheme are likely to be more complex compared to produc-
tion reduction schemes.  While the latter has an advantage over the export 
quota, in so far as it is based on a uniform percentage cut in levels of pro-
duction, the former involves an agreement on a price objective and a heavy 
negotiation process to allocate a global export quota among the various 
producing countries.
  In addition to the most complex and time-consuming constraints for the 
negotiation of an export quota scheme, the design of this type of supply man-
agement scheme needs to appropriately incorporate changes in comparative 
advantage of member countries. Furthermore, a full  participation of actual 
and potential major suppliers will avoid “free-rider” problems by increased 
exports of non-member countries.  Although a production reduction scheme 
does not give rise to major disagreements about market share, as compared 
to export quotas, the lack of reliable statistics of crop outturn in  develop-
ing countries may jeopardise the implementation of a production regulation 
agreement.
  While the implementation of a stock reduction scheme holds no specific 
price objective, it is less costly in terms of negotiation efforts as compared 
to an export quota arrangement, the establishment of an ad valorem tax may 
have detrimental effects for the exporting country.  Although  the application 
of a uniform export tax would not discriminate among different producing 
countries, not affecting relative selling prices,  to the extent that countries’ 
2 Study on Improving the global 
coffee suppply/demand balance 
throughmeasures designed to 
eliminate low-grade coffees, EB 
3778/01, Intenational Coffee 
Organization.8 9
short term price elasticities differ, their relative gains in export revenues 
could be affected. In addition, a successful implementation of an ad valorem 
tax scheme is closely linked to the relative size of the domestic market of the 
exporting country.  In the case of a country with a relatively large domestic 
consumption market, the application of a uniform ad valorem export tax will 
raise export revenue by relatively less than the average, or even produce a 
falling off revenues, if the tax goes  along with a diversion of potential ex-
ports to the domestic market.  
  
  After the suspension of the ICA in 1989, different supply management 
initiatives toward price stabilisation were undertaken by Central American 
countries in 1993, joined later by Colombia and Brazil with the objective to 
improve coffee prices through export retention schemes and production con-
trols. In a similar manner the African producers took their own initiative to 
purse similar retention mechanisms.  In September 1993, an agreement was 
reached  on the modalities of a retention plan under the  umbrella of a newly 
established Association of Coffee Producing Countries (ACPC).
  The declaration establishing ACPC states that the Association’s aim is 
to balance world supply and demand to stabilise coffee prices at a fair level 
for producers, achieving at the same time increasing consumption levels. 
Signatories of the ACPC agreed to retain 20% of their stock when the indica-
tor coffee price was bellow 75 US cents/lb, only 10 per cent would be retain 
for prices in between 75 and 80 cents, while above 80 cents, the retention 
plan would be suspended. In a similar way the more recent retention plan 
launched in October 2000 and abandoned in September 2001 had a price 
band in between 95 and 105 cents/lb to retain stocks.
  A limitation of this type of agreements is its degree of difficulty in ensur-
ing compliance if consumer countries do not participate in the schemes by 
requiring certificates of origin for all coffee imports entering their markets. 
In addition finding adequate finance to monitor the agreement, through an 
international control organisation, or financing the cost of stocking the ad-
ditional coffee being held off the export markets, or simply destroying or 
diverting stocks to alternative uses, is particularly onerous for many develop-
ing countries.
  In general, ambitious initiatives regarding the producing side of the sector 
have not been very fortunate of late. As an example, since Palm and Vogel-
vang (1991)`s careful study, there is a reasonable consensus that the end of 
the quota system managed by the ICO (International Coffee Organisation), 
worked against the interest of the producing countries.10 11
3    The key point 
    On the other hand, the analysis of the commodity chain ranging 
from the coffee cherries in the hands of the harvesters to the expresso cup in 
those of the final consumer has been done by many, and Ponte (2001) seems 
a lucid description of the process. A key finding is the general agreement that 
value added has moved “to the North”. Indeed, if in the seventies around 20 
per cent of total income was retained by producers and 53 per cent stayed in 
the consuming countries, this changed to 13 and 78 per cent, respectively, 
between 1989/90 and 1994/95, Talbot (1997). Other detailed computations 
produce similar values, like Pelupessy (1999)`s for the Costa Rica – Ger-
many flow, with 14.6 per cent staying in Costa Rica and 71.5 per cent in Ger-
many. 
  Irrespective of whether the percentage that goes to producing countries is 
really at 13 or maybe has only slightly decreased from 20, the main issue in 
the world coffee market is this great asymmetry in revenues.
  The inequality in the distribution of value added clearly signals to a 
highly concentrated market structure in all parts of the chain in the consum-
ing countries, where high rents are being extracted. How to decrease this 
concentration is not an easy task. In broad terms, more competition must 
take place in these countries, making the different segments that lead to 
the final consumer more contestable. As, in spite of a few antitrust actions 
against the big producers, neither “competition cases” nor legal problems 
persist in the coffee market, injecting more competition in an established 
and stable structure is something not to be achieved by a single measure or 
in the short term. All the proposals below should then be regarded as differ-
ent enabling measures to decrease concentration in the consuming-countries 
side and then, as a consequence, progressively transfer more value added to 
producers.
  It is our belief that effective help to the CPC, and ultimately improve-
ment of the lot of small producers in these countries, must begin not in the 
CPC themselves but in the consuming countries. Without properly and duly 
changing the present market structure, no significant transformation of the 
North-South terms of trade in this commodity will occur.   
3.1     A closer look into the market structure
    One of the central reasons of the asymmetric relation between 
the international price of coffee and domestic prices in the last 20 years, is  
found in the  changes in the international coffee supply chain. According to 
a study by Morisset (1997), a possible explanation for the increasing spread 
in prices is described, among others, in the changing market structure of the 
transaction modes between producers and wholesalers, and between whole-
salers and consumers. 10 11
  The main changes in the coffee supply chain in the last two decades have 
taken place basically at the levels of intermediation, transformation and dis-
tribution (importing, roasting and retailing), which have been characterised 
by greater consolidation through mergers and acquisitions. While at the same 
time there has been a pronounced decrease in concentration at the levels of 
production and exporting.
  Major cost in production are establishment cost (land preparation, seed-
lings, planting, irrigation systems), annual variable costs (weeding, pruning, 
pest/disease control, harvesting, processing, labour) and annual fixed costs. 
In general, production can be characterised with low barriers to entry, a fact 
that explains , after the recent liberalisation reforms in producing countries, 
te atomisation among domestic intermediaries (who buy the coffee from the 
farmer and/or export the coffee to foreign intermediaries). Needless to say 
that until this stage no implications are observed in terms of a change in the 
surplus structure in importing countries. A different reasoning applies in the 
case of vertical integration between domestic and international intermediar-
ies. 
  The number of international traders importing coffee into consuming 
countries has grown in size and decreased in number.  In clear contrast with 
the process of atomisation in producer countries, importers in consuming 
countries have increased their bargaining power vis-à-vis exporters. Trans-
lated into basic economics, this means that the price formation is now less 
related to world supply and demand and closer to the definition of ‘transfer 
price’ within the same trading firm. At this stage of the value chain we start 
to perceive a clear shift in surplus, since the importer has now more control 
over the amounts paid by the exporter. The four firm concentration ratio 
among international traders is 41 %, with Neuman Kaffee, Volcafé , Cargill 
and Esteve absorbing the lion share. 
The situation among roasters is even more consolidated. Concentration of 
ownership has increased rapidly in last 20 years in the production of proc-
essed coffee (roasted and soluble). Roasted coffee is concentrated in hands 
of  major transnational food corporations, such as Nestlé, Philip Morris and 
SaraLee/Douwe Egberts (see Tabe 1). Sara Lee Corporation is a typical 
example of increasing consolidation in the coffee sector through mergers and 
acquisitions3.
    
Leading Firms Country Origin Market Share (%)
Nestlé Switzerland 25
Philip Morris (Kraft Jacobs 
Suchard)
US 24
Sara Lee/Douwe Egberts US 7
Procter & Gamble US 7
Tschibo/Eduscho Germany 6
Four Firm Concentration Ratio 63
Sources: Food World R & C
Table 1. Processed Coffee Industry: Market Shares of Leading Firms, % of developed countries, 1999
3 Sara Lee made  the following 
purchases from 1978 onwards: 
Van Nelle (The Netherllands) in 
1989, Superior Coffee and Foods 
(US) in 1990, Balirny Praha 
(Czekoslovakia),  Harris Coffee 
and Tea Company (Australia) 
, Mc Garvey Coffee (US), and  
Compack Trading & Packing 
(Hungary, 51%), in 1991; Café de 
Ponto (Brazil), Continental Cof-
fee Products Co. (US), Wechsler 
Coffee Corp. (US) and Chock Full 
O’Nuts Corp. (USA), in 1998, and 
Hils Bros., MJB, Chase & San-
born from Nestlé (US) in 2000.12 13
Table 2. Concentration of Roasters in  the European Union in 1995 and 1997
Country 1995   1997
Companies/Brand Shares Companies/Brand Shares




























Netherlands Douwe Egberts 69 Douwe Egberts 69














































































Source: Coffee and Cocoa International’s «Coffee International File», (1)  in Verstraete N. (1998) “Nicaragua en de Internationale 
KoffieMarkt: Zijn Max Havelaar en de Wereldwinkels een reëel alternatief voor de kleine boeren?, University of Antwerp.
  Table 2 reports data on the concentration of European roasters in 1995 
and 1997. The high levels of concentration in several of the European 
countries (higher than 50 in the Netherlands, United Kingdom, Sweden and 
Belgium) have raised the mistrust of consumer organisations and triggered a 
number of antitrust actions against transnational corporations but not enough 
to affect their operations.  The most popular in the literature (Talbot, 1997) 
is the antitrust action undertaken by the United Kingdom Monopolies and 
Mergers Commissions (MMC) initiated against Nestlé to investigate Nestlé’s 
pricing practices following the 1989 crash in prices, after which retail prices 12 13
of instant coffee remained at their pre-crash levels in the UK.  on instant cof-
fee prices. Although the MMC report found no evidence that Nestlé’s market 
position unabled it to gain an unfair advantage over its competitors, the fact 
that the public version of the report removed most of the data on Nestlé’s 
profits is a clear example of  limited access to information on margin costs 
and production in the sector.
  Similar to the developments in roasting, the retail coffee distribution 
industry  has become increasingly large in scale and concentration. Coffee 
retailing is currently moving away from small independent outlets into large 
scale distribution chains such as supermarkets and hypermarkets. The largest 
retail distribution chains market their own private labels and also sell labels 
of other roasters. Own labels have the advantage of saving in advertising and 
outside-promotion costs and retail at a substantial discount rate as compared 
to traditional roasters. To avoid possible supply shortages with coffee sup-
pliers, large retail firms have established their own soluble/roasting coffee 
processing plants. The increasing concentration in the retail distribution has 
changed the balance of power vis-à-vis large processors, allowing them to 
direct invest in production facilities or simple reject trade operations.
  In addition to the consolidation in specific levels of the coffee value chain 
(importers, roasters and retailers), transnational corporations are emerging as 
powerful actors  operating  at other levels of the value chain, through up-
stream or downstream vertical integration. Vertical integration is particularly 
strong among exporters and importers.  Such a trend implies that the same 
TNC exports the coffee from the producing country and imports it into the 
consuming country. This trend has direct implications on the structure of 
value added in the producing country and on the meaningfulness of interna-
tional prices. As mentioned above vertical integration also occurs to a certain 
extent between retailers and roasters, especially as a result of the increasing 
popularity of the own private labels.
  Since the structure of the coffee industry is clearly characterised as oli-
gopolistic at various levels of production, transnational corporations will be 
in a position to control the surpluses to their own favour and hence the retail 
prices of coffee regardless of international price movements. In the present 
situation of market failure, the oligopolistic structure of the coffee  market 
precludes  new entrants to the market either through barriers to entry inher-
ent to the coffee market organisation or in a deliberate way imposing enter 
detention.
  Typical barriers to entry take the form of Sunk Costs4. A pertinent sunk 
cost to a roaster would be the costs prior to entry to build up a brand image, 
or in the case of retailers, investment in physical assets for warehousing 
facilities. Most of the larger firms operating in the coffee production chain 
have already reached a considerable size and operate at lower costs due to 
economies of scale.  A small roaster, unless he deliberately targets a spe-
cific market niche, will not be able to meet the minimum cost competitive 
4 Sunk costs are costs for which 
the investment associated with 
its payment can not be rescued  
for other purpose,  or be resold 
to cover alternative investrment 
costs.  Examples of sunk costs are 
exenditure in legal advice , market 
surveys .or expenditures on non 
convertible plant equipment.14 15
requirements to conduct business in the industry. For similar reasons, larger 
incumbent firms have easier access to credit vis-à-vis  smaller ones.
  A key barrier to entry is product differentiation or ‘brandification’. It 
is on the basis of de-commoditification that roasters and retailers build up 
brand loyalty and goodwill assets. Large roasters invest millions of dollars 
to establish and market new brands of coffee to capture specific markets. 
This product differentiation strategy has been a typical characteristic of the 
aggressive mergers and acquisition campaign of Sara Lee/Douwe Egberts 
which has built up an impressive brand variety.
  Last, but not least, advertising and R & D, patents and technology con-
trol,  make up a severe limitation to new entrants.  Roasters dedicate sub-
stantial outlays in advertising and promotion as prerequisites for sustaining 
respectable market shares. Furthermore, the creation of new products and 
proprietary control of innovative processing technologies, such as the intro-
duction of the freeze-dried method and vacuum packing, are crucial tools to 
gain market share.     
  The maintenance of a system with high barriers to entry  gives the large 
coffee traders, roasters and retailers the necessary incentives and ability to 
respond asymmetrically to changes in world coffee prices. At periods when 
world prices rise, traders can easily transfer this increase to roasters, roast-
ers transfer it to retailers, and retailers to consumers. On the other hand, 
when world prices fall, as in the present situation, any one of the three actors 
involved has enough market power to keep its sale prices constant, or even 
increase them. The retailer, being the last player in the game, is conscious of 
the possibility of transfering the mark-up to the consumer without any prob-
lem, given that the elasticity of demand for coffee is relatively low. Thus, 
ultimately it is the consumer who will have to bear the final burden.  This 
implies that consumers  will have to pay more  for the same product with the 
same values added along the chain of production. In this kind of oligopolistic 
framework, where non of the actors involved suffer from mark-up increases, 
there is a  relatively high level of  understanding and co-operation in the 
industry.
  A policy oriented towards the eradication of market failures in the inter-
national and consuming coffee markets, will eliminate the oligopolization of 
the various stages of the market, reduce the international power of TNC and  
will help to shift the surplus share from consumer to producer countries. 
3.2    The coffee producing countries, with a little emphasis on  
    Brazil  
    If coffee producers differ among them, Brazil is perhaps the 
most atypical producer. Beyond still ranking as the first world supplier it also 
has a large domestic market – actually the second, in a country basis -, what 
may turn proposals feasible for it meaningless for other, smaller producers. 14 15
However, this special situation may also be helpful in allowing, a priori, a 
wider set of measures that could later be adapted to less complex realities.
  As most producing countries, Brazil has been suffering from the steady 
decay in international prices, the mix towards lower quality beans induced 
by the large trading companies and the entry of low quality Robusta suppli-
ers, specially Vietnam, which compete with part of its produce. Moreover, as 
in many other coffee-producing nations, strong market deregulation and the 
exit of governmental operation and controls during the nineties eventually 
decreased the bargaining power of small farmers and co-operatives in the 
domestic trade.
  Notwithstanding, being a Robusta and, like Ethiopia, a Natural Arabica 
producer, Brazil, thanks to its vastness and climatic diversity, is – within 
these two broad categories - a most diversified supplier, offering, not only in 
volume but in grades of quality and taste as well, a very wide range of cof-
fees. This, together with the high domestic demand, makes for a much more 
competitive producer’s market, than in most African, Asian or Latin Ameri-
can suppliers.
  The differences between Brazil and other CPC (coffee producing coun-
tries) raise an important point usually absent in the discussions of solutions 
to improve the conditions of the producers. There is not an abstract, repre-
sentative producing country. Producing countries can differ widely, what 
entails that no general, uniform solution exists to their problems. A serious 
analysis of the impact of different proposals should take into account a basic 
typology of the set of producers, what is unfortunately lacking. 
4     The proposals 
4.1    A Preliminary (and Old) Issue: Tariffs
    Broadly, ways to revert – at least to a certain extent – the 
present situation could only be centred in two alternatives: i) re-install some-
how a system of managed supply, with generalised adhesion, or ii) to transfer 
value-added activities in the chain to the producers. 
  The former seems unlikely, notwithstanding mixed successes of the re-
cent ACPC (Association of Coffee Producing Countries) efforts. Nowadays 
manifold alternatives to produce the same blend through different combina-
tions of beans and roasting degrees have substantially increased the probabil-
ity of free riders to any conceived agreement. 
  As regards the second option, proposals for upgrading the coffee that 
will be exported must first of all deal with the tariff issue. Indeed, while the 
“green bean” enters the EU at zero tariffs, this is not the case for the coffee 
that has been somehow transformed, which can be taxed at values ranging 
from 7.5 to 9.0 for non-ACP countries. These tariffs are naturally protecting 16 17
the established processors – roasters and others in the chain -, that use the 
cheap green beans as major input. So, a first point is to accelerate the fall in 
the tariff structure for derived-coffee goods in order to allow for the entrance 
of higher value products at competitive prices. These changes may depend 
on the design of what is going to be transferred to producers’ countries and 
are not necessarily unpalatable.
4.2    Proposal One 
    The next issue is on what to transfer and how. The two bot-
tlenecks in the producing chain are, in sequence, the trading companies 
and the roasters. Both constitute clear oligopolies, with more concentration 
on the side of roasters. Bypassing or countervailing their operations is not 
easy; scale and flexibility are key elements of their daily practice and sensi-
ble alternatives must match these conditions to qualify for market share. In 
the former ICO-administered supply system, with state market regulators, 
producing countries were able to have scale and scope economies that gave 
them some clout on purchasers. Given the apparent impossibility to return 
to this system, one idea would be to help the creation of domestic trading 
companies – not necessarily government supported – that could achieve a 
considerable export volume. These trading would be associated to roasters 
that, depending on the final product envisaged, would perform the roasting 
in the country and export the roasted – and sometimes ground – coffee. This 
would also break the importers-exporters verticalisation structure described 
in section 4.1.
  In logical terms, the above suggestion has no novelty at all; the question 
is how to make it feasible. We propose that these companies will be encour-
aged by the EC, especially in the form of joint ventures between producing 
groups and EU actors in the coffee business. There is nothing against that the 
European partners be members of – or have as major investors – one of the 
big European trading or roasters; provided a new venture is created, on an 
equal basis, involving the EU and one (or a group of) CPC. 
  The fact that a “North-South” partnership is created would mean that, part 
or the totality of the coffee sold to the trading, beyond receiving a fair price, 
could be roasted in situ creating a higher-value export. The mix of roasted 
and green beans exports would be the result of the strategy of the new 
company: it could have lines ranging from green beans exports to supply 
the traditional roasting chains to semi-finished products that would almost 
directly go to the final consumer. Of course, emphasis would be placed on 
the more elaborate or higher quality side of the range; help from the EC, for 
instance, being conditioned on a certain percentage of the product mix being 
of the more elaborate case. Anyhow, even the green beans business would be 
conducted under the lines of the fair-trade idea, with principles similar to the 
ones in the Max Havelaar initiative5.
  The question of size and flexibility must then be addressed. As known, 
the supply managed inventories (SMI) strategy of the big roasters allowed 
5 We do not necessarily sponsor 
all the criteria and procedures in 
the Max Havelaar initiative.16 17
them to transfer the burden of the huge stocks to the tradings, while they, 
cleverly manipulating the different substitutions that give way to the same 
blend, gained flexibility and lower input costs. 
  The existing blends, which undoubtedly have educated – or rather, in-
duced - the taste of millions of consumers, are sometimes raised as a barrier 
to entry. In fact, they have been purposedly created as such, within the “de-
commodisation of coffee” strategy6. Thanks to it – and massive advertising 
expenditures-, firm concentration, accompanied by a wider scope of brands 
offered, has been taking place. Notwithstanding, the “blend effect” depends 
on how market penetration is envisaged. The Starbucks, Café Gourmet and 
other experiences have shown that, as regards taste, good or at least decent 
coffee can be accepted provided the proper marketing and distribution take 
place7. 
  Thus, one idea would be to promote, through these joint-ventures, new 
flavours or coffees in the lines of the upgrading strategies that have been 
taking place worldwide: single origin, quality controlled simple blends, 
adequate roasting, etc8. Additionally, as coffee is not champagne, good-val-
ue-for-your money coffee, non-branded, should be supplied. The case study 
of Colombia, when it started to place its coffee (beans) in the international 
market by promoting “good quality coffee”, just this, is an example worth to 
be reminded in this strategy.  
  The European partner will be a key element in designing the mix, taking 
into account the market needs and realities. This is also crucial as regards 
distribution, the last key element in the coffee chain. Size will again be im-
portant here, to provide minimum supply quantities that would allow strong 
positioning in at least one regional, national or sub-national sizeable market. 
Agreement or establishment of the venture with a supermarket chain would 
be a plus.
  The above points raise doubts on the feasibility of the idea in small 
producing countries. If, on one hand, maybe two companies of the type 
proposed could be created in Brazil, in many African producers, on the 
other hand, there would be neither scale nor scope for making the initiative 
sensible. Moreover, if “the blend” is not an entry barrier per se, it is however 
a tremendous cost-cutting strategy. Placing a roaster in a producing country, 
away from the great consumption markets and with much less flexibility than 
that of those established in the EU, even with some external help would have 
a strong possibility of being a failure, for lack of competitiveness with other 
market actors. 
  This seems at first to limit the idea to Brazil and to the segment of spe-
cialised, connoisseur coffees. However, if a Brazilian experiment is success-
ful, the lower barriers and the transfer of technology implicit in it should 
enable other producers in the exporting countries to take a similar step ahead 
either by themselves. This could be made either in a regional basis, aggre-
6 Aimed at making it theoretically 
closer to a monopolistic competi-
tion good, like cars, for instance.
7 It is worth reminding that 
Starbucks Coffee Company is 
nowadays the leading retailer, 
roaster and brand of speciality 
coffee in the world. It employs 
50 000 people and has more than 
4 800 stores worldwide. As of 
November 2001, the company has 
made a partnership with Compaq 
to provide I.T. solutions to its 
business needs and offer Compaq 
internet services in its stores.
8 We are aware that “higher 
quality coffee” is not enough to 
have a considerable impact on the 
existing conditions. That is why 
it is only one component of the 
proposed product mix.18 19
gating a number of small producers - or through the existing regional inte-
gration agreements already existing in Africa, for instance – or by securing 
similar ventures in the consuming countries (always in an upgrading trend). 
In this last case, Brazil could act as a third partner, enabling the ventures in 
the other countries. Given that, as said (in footnote 8), specialised coffees 
represent a small fraction of the market – less than 4 per cent -, making for a 
low impact initiative, the initiative must also contemplate more standard and 
traditional segments, instant coffee included.
  But one must also ask whether, in the producing countries, there would be 
support for such enterprise, or rather, taking a big producer like Brazil, why 
such appropriation of the chain had not been conceived. 
  Interest arises if a clear picture of higher profits is presented, though two 
other difficulties might work against this. The first is location. Elementary 
economic geography tells that factories should in principle be close to their 
final markets. Given the present structure of the coffee chain in the EU, plac-
ing a significant roaster “in the South”, even if sensible in terms of volume 
and flexibility, may increase in a sub-optimal fashion transportation and 
logistic costs. Disregarding regional initiatives9, this seems to leave again, in 
a first screening, only Brazil as a viable location, given that its huge domes-
tic market could act both as a hedge to adverse (foreign) demand movements 
and as a platform to cover fixed costs, guaranteeing competitive final prices. 
Nevertheless, margins are so high - and constant - in the consuming-coun-
tries side, that well chosen locations in other CPC, together with efficient 
operation, could place a product at competitive prices in Europe. Second, 
there might be protectionist moves from the EU firms or coffee lobbies, wav-
ing the banner of unemployment, against such location changes. As regards 
these arguments, the right thing to be said is that there is not enough public 
information on the consumption side of the chain to allow a analysis of these 
points – something that will be touched again below.
  Regarding the lack of similar initiatives in the producer’s side, a few ex-
planations look sensible; the tariff and non-tariff barriers, specially in emerg-
ing coffee consumers - like Eastern European countries -, where new firms 
could have a chance, being a first negative incentive to further processing of 
the green beans. The lack of information and knowledge on the right chan-
nels where to place a more diversified product in the foreign markets - some-
thing the joint venture tries to solve - is also a deterrence. Finally, for large 
farms in CPC - which could have conceived something in this line -, even in 
a depression period, profits - given the quantities traded - can be sufficiently 
high as not to create incentives to improve their activities. So, for reasons 
different from those of small farmers, they also lie down and help in keeping 
the present market structure. 
9 Dependent, beforehand, on a 
regional agreement of some sort.18 19
4.3    A comment on oversupply and elasticities
    The suggestion sketched above is not a solution to the so-called 
oversupply problem, especially as regards low quality Robusta. In fact, the 
proposal has a bias towards higher quality outputs that, though acting as an 
incentive for a flight in this direction, is not enough to divert the desirable 
amount to solve the oversupply problem. 
  Taxes on lower quality imports can have a mixed effect, if passed to 
producers, lowering further prices at the farm gate. In principle, we do not 
favour such a solution; if applied, however, it should be later in the chain, 
taxing lower quality blends to roasters, for instance, after a specified volume, 
as will be also addressed later. Some form of production management, in 
the lines of the ACPC initiatives, seems difficult to be achieved without a 
controlling instance in the side of the importers10, particularly given the new 
recent failures. Nevertheless, the Commission could help in this, by trading 
some kind of concessions to those countries that participate in the agreement, 
provided the agreement has a size that counts. This, however, must be care-
fully studied so as not to violate a WTO rule or principle.
  The oversupply issue, however, can also be looked at the other way 
round, and seen as something temporary, due not to excess in supply but to 
a fall in demand.  This leads to a point that, in our view, might be a fallacy 
in the present analyses of the question. It is common to say that the price 
elasticity of demand for coffee is low, the market having already achieved a 
mature stage. Though this is likely to be true in an aggregate fashion, con-
sidering the whole of the US and EU consumption markets, we pose that the 
elasticity may be much higher for specific – and significant – market seg-
ments still unexplored. In the European case this segment would be made 
of a lower income population, with a large percentage of migrants from 
(traditionally) coffee-consuming cultures. In case a better quality, affordable 
product is offered to them, a reasonable increase in demand may take place. 
Moreover, as eyed by EU enterprises, the Eastern European market offers a 
new potential to be exploited, with certainly higher elasticities. This market 
is particularly attractive, not only because of the possibilities to increase 
consumption per se, but also of those related to the creation of distribution 
and point-of-sales strategies. The success of Project OGI in Russia, with its 
Pirogi, Club Project and Ulitsa OGI cafés is a good example of the unex-
plored potential in these new markets.
4.4    Proposal Two.    
    Beyond the previous idea, two other points are worth mention-
ing. The first is the great asymmetry in information regarding production and 
consumption. If the distribution of growing areas is fully known, according 
to almost every aspect of interest – namely output, productivity, quality, 
physical and environmental conditions, spatial dispersion (or concentration), 
economic and financial aspects, social and managerial organisation of the 
farmers -, the same does not apply to the consumption phenomenon. Apart  
from a few basic statistics, there is scarce knowledge on the structure and 
10 As happened in the past.20 21
key characteristics of consumption patterns. This poses additional difficulties 
to the producing countries, in organising not only their global policies but 
specific strategies as well. One thing of great help would be the systematic 
provision of basic intelligence on what happens in the consuming countries. 
Statistics of the quantities sold for household consumption and for other situ-
ations, by broad categories of “coffee” and point of sale could be produced 
in an annual basis, for each country, with perhaps the help of Eurostat. They 
should be matched by the exports/imports data and complemented by (ag-
gregate) country statistics on the roasting sector, here included data on the 
workforce. This simple measure, practically costless, would extremely help 
producing countries design their own market and producing strategies.
4.5    Proposal Three
    The second is the creation of a fund, backed by a common EU 
tax on roasted coffee. At present, there is a wide diversity, within the EU, as 
regards domestic taxes on processed coffee. They are applied, at different 
levels, in Germany, Belgium and Denmark, there existing no precise infor-
mation about the other members. Within the framework of the single market 
tax harmonisation process, a common tax could be created11. A percentage of 
these tax revenues would go to a European Coffee Fund.
  The example of the Danish International Investment Fund, could serve as 
a useful example to be reproduced in an European scale. In fact, The Danish 
Fund (Industrialisation Fund for Developing Countries, IFU), was created 
in 1967 in part with the proceeds from coffee import duties and the internal 
tax, was originally known as the Coffee Fund. Its purpose of this Fund is 
the promotion of economic activity in developing countries, in collaboration 
with the Danish private sector. 
  The European Coffee Fund - ECF should be regarded as part of the EU 
initiatives to aid developing countries. It would be a European institution 
devoted to the CPC and with two main programmes. 
  The first would be, through the ICO, to support an advertising campaign 
on coffee in general, aimed at counterbalancing the increasing “brandifica-
tion” of coffee. Brands are a major barrier to entry in the coffee market12, and 
even the relatively successful new entrants, related to ideas like “speciality”, 
“shadow” or “organic coffee”, have spent quite an amount of money and 
effort in (conventional or unconventional) propaganda. The ads would make 
the case for coffee, the general drink, passing, for instance, basic informa-
tion on the characteristics of the plant and the drink. This campaign could be 
extended to the future Eastern European members of the Union, as a further 
assurance that EU processors would not have privileged access to these new 
markets. An EU quality label, to be appended on every coffee sold in the Un-
ion could complement this initiative, helping to create a level playing field 
for products from outside the EU. 
11 Of course, not at the highest 
present level.
12 An annual survey of the UK’s 
leading 100 grocery brands, 
conducted by A C Nielsen, found 
Nestlé’s Nescafé instant coffee as 
the top third (surpassed only by 
Coca-Cola and PepsiCo’s Walkers 
crisps). The Nestlé brands fetches 
£ 312,1m in annual sales in the 
UK. [Financial Times, November 
22, 2001]20 21
  The second half of the Fund’s budget would be used in a careful diver-
sification effort, to take place in selected producing countries; this would 
help in streamlining and upgrading supply. Given the not very enthusiastic 
records of recent diversification attempts, these measures should be carefully 
designed to give a minimum consistency to the agricultural changes induced. 
Involvement of the ACPC could not only improve the knowledge of feasible 
measures as give wider support and visibility to them.  
4.6    Suggested background studies to support the proposals.
    The proposals outlined above must be complemented by a 
series of detailed studies. We describe six of them, leaving aside the question 
of creating and implementing the European Coffee Fund:
a)  A Typology of Producing Countries: basic to a better understanding of the  
universe of coffee-producing countries, this is an economic-statistical project 
which, taking into account different characteristics of the countries, will 
define clusters of similar producers. Policy proposals could then be matched 
to these different groups.
b)  The European Roasted Coffee Market: the purpose of this study is the 
production of intelligence on the roasted coffee market in Europe. The study 
can help in checking the possibilities of the market in terms of the share do-
mestically produced (i.e., inside the EU) / imported roasted coffee, as well as 
evaluating the impact on the present roasters’ structure of a greater penetra-
tion of imported roasted coffee. It can also help in the definition of the basic 
market statistics that should be produced every year.
c)  Harmonisation of Coffee Taxes in the EU and A System of Coffee Sta-
tistics: These two studies should be commissioned and supervised by the 
EC. The first would suggest, within the framework of EC tax harmonisation 
measures, the design of a single tax system – stating the level, when and 
how to enforce the taxes – that would provide the resources for the European 
Coffee Fund. The second is self-explanatory and should be conducted by 
Eurostat.
d)  Business Facilitation for EU-CPC Joint Ventures: without proposing 
distorting facilities or (new) subsidies, this study should get deeper into the 
available conditions that could be of help to middle-sized joint ventures as 7 
proposed above. Analysis of potential obstacles to the operation of these ven-
tures in Eastern European countries is a must. Of course, if low cost facilita-
tion is possible, it should be taken into account. The final goal is to develop a 
guide to those interested in creating such ventures.
e)   A Closer EU-ICO Partnership: As a UN organ the ICO is a natural insti-
tutional partner for a general initiative on coffee. This is more the establish-
ment of a well-targeted co-operation than a project or study. Paramount in 
this co-operation is the design, under the proper legal and institutional frame-
work, of a non-branded, coffee-promoting advertising campaign, in the EU 
and Eastern Europe.22 23
f)  Quantities sold for household consumption and for other situations, by 
broad categories of “coffee” and point of sale could be produced in an an-
nual basis, for each country, with perhaps the help of Eurostat. They should 
be matched by the exports/imports data and complemented by (aggregate) 
country statistics on the roasting sector, here included data on the workforce. 
This simple measure, practically costless, would extremely help producing 
countries design their own market and producing strategies.
  Annex: Institutions and Persons Visited
  In Belgium:
Mr. Johan Declercq, Producenten Relaties, Max Havelaar België
Mr.  Wendel Trio, OXFAM -Wereldwinkel
Mr. Yvan Robouts, Director  Koninklijk Verbond van Kofiebranders
  In Brazil:
Ambassador Jório Dauster; Former President of the Brazilian Coffee Insti-
tute (Instituto Brasileiro do Café - IBC);
Mr. Manoel Aranha Corrêa do Lago; Director, Valorização, Empresa de Café 
S/A;
Mr. José Sette, Coffee Expert ;
Selected small-size coffee farmers in the states of Paraná and São Paulo.
  In Switzerland (Geneva):
Mr. Bertil Byskov; International Trade Centre UNCTAD/WTO
Mr. Morten Scholer,  Gourmet Coffee Project; International Trade Centre 
UNCTAD/WTO
Mr. Mehmet Arda, Chief General Studies Sector, Commodities Division, 
UNCTAD
  In the U.K.:
Mr. Celsius Lodder; Executive Director, International Coffee Organisation 
– ICO;
Mrs. Karen St Jean-Kufuor ; Senior Economist, Association of Coffee Pro-
ducing Countries – ACPC;22 23
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